|
Author Roger Stanyard specialises in economic analysis and strategic
management in satellite communications and associated markets. He
has worked on major projects for a wide number of satellite operators,
service providers, telecoms carriers and broadcasters, both in Europe
and the United States.
The author is widely known in Europe and the USA as an expert in
his area of specialisation and frequently presents papers at conferences.
He holds a degree in economics from the University of London, and
an MBA from Cranfield Institute of Technology and a postgraduate
Diploma in Finance.
The Ka-band Report aims to provide a comprehensive survey of the
current environment for Ka-band satellites. These represent the
next major opportunity for the satellite communications industry.
The term Ka-band satellite is now generally recognised as a shorthand
term for a new generation of communications satellites that will
use on-board processing and switching to provide full two way services
to and from small earth stations comparable in size to today's satellite
television dish. To do this efficiently they will use multiple pencil
like spot beams. A number of proposals also include use of inter-satellite
links. A variety of orbits are being considered. Apart from the
conventional geostationary orbit, both low earth and middle earth
orbit systems have been planned.
Such Ka-band satellite systems have also been described in other
terms such as "multimedia satellites", "ATM satellites",
"broadband switched" and "broadband interactive satellites".
The first two terms are generally inaccurate in that Ka-band satellites
can be used for other applications than multimedia or providing
an ATM platform. Indeed, it remains questionable whether many of
the proposals are suitable for ATM. The Ka-band Report uses the
most commonly used shorthand, Ka-band satellites" to describe
such systems. The term "ATM Satellite" is also incorrect
because on-board switching can involve either ATM switching or circuit
switching or both.
Moreover, there are in existence a number of Ka-band satellites
that do not use on-board processing or pencil beams or inter-satellite
links and whose use has either been confined to experimental work
or conventional telecommunications or broadcasting traffic. The
Ka-band Report covers these satellites only insofar as they affect
the new generation of satellites.
However, use of on-board processing and switching are not confined
to Ka-band satellites. Already the satellite communications industry
is beginning to think about using even higher frequencies to provide
services similar to or beyond those planned for the new generation
of Ka-band satellites. The Ka-band Report draws attention to Motorola's
M-Star and Celestri projects.
Indeed, on-board processing and switching (effectively the provision
of the equivalent of a sophisticated telephone switchboard on a
satellite) are already employed in satellites providing mobile communications
to hand held receivers. One of a new generation of mobile satellite
systems (Iridium) employs Ka-band communications for links between
fixed ground stations that interconnect the public switched telephone
networks to the satellites. However, the links between the satellites
and the hand held receivers are in L-band. A number of GSO MSS systems
under development also use OBP and switching.
Understanding the relationship between inter-satellite links, pencil
spot beams and on-board processing and switching is essential in
understanding the commercial role these satellites are aiming to
fulfil.
In effect, the switching capability is capable of making them operate
like a public telephone network but with the facility to offer digital
services with a wide variety of bit rates. Users will be offered
bit rate on demand and its variation, variable
bit rate on demand - that is to say they will only pay for
the time that they use a link. This contrasts with conventional
satellites where users usually have to pay for permanent leases.
That only makes it economic to use satellites where there is a massive
amount of information to be moved, such as TV channels and trunk
telephony links.
In contrast, the Ka-band concept offers the equivalent of a local
drop telephone circuit where the user pays for temporary lease of
time. The Ka-band environment also allows an alternative, charging
per bit of information moved.
However, such services require a lot of bandwidth because each link
will usually be operating on a point to point basis. The prime method
of using the available spectrum efficiently is to use multiple "pencil"
spot beams, each covering only a small area of the earth. This allows
frequency re-use in much the same way as a cellular phone network
re-uses spectrum.
Use of multiple spot beams in itself demands the use of on-board
processing and switching to direct each transmission path between
the different spot beams used for uplinking and downlinking. Similarly,
inter-satellite links with similar Ka-band satellites will demand
switching capabilities.
In effect, the on-board processing and switching capability is
a network management facility. The Ka-band satellite operators will
each become like telephone companies but with their telephone exchanges
in the sky.
In the long term it looks likely that there will be a "merger"
of services offered by mobile satellite systems with those offered
by "mainstream" Ka-band satellites.
The sudden interest in Ka-band satellite communications during
the middle of this decade is not an accident. It comes as a result
of supply economics meeting a perceived demand for new services.
On the supply side, nearly two decades of R&D into using the
Ka-band for satellite communications has produced results. Hitherto,
the satellite communications industry has been wary of using Ka-band
because it is subject to substantial interference from rain. That
problem has now largely been circumvented. Much more significantly,
NASA launched an advanced Ka-band satellite in 1993 that uses on-board
processing and switching, pencil spot beams and the Ka-band - the
three key technologies for the new commercial Ka-band satellites.
NASA's ACTS satellite performed extremely well; the project was
very well managed and involved testing a wide variety of new ground
stations and services (the ACTS experiments are continuing).
By the mid-1990s it was clear that the existing frequency bands
being used by satellite operators had insufficient spectrum left
to provide new bandwidth hungry two way broadband services. The
Ka-band, in contrast, was little used. The Ka-band available to
satellite operators involved a massive 2.5-3.5 GHz of spectrum -
that is to say some 4-7 times that available to some C-band satellite
operators.
On the demand side, the growth of Internet as a mass-market consumer
(and business) service and perceived likely growth in demand for
multimedia (services combining two way video, voice, data and graphics)
indicated a need to provide substantive infrastructure for two way
services and associated switching technology. Ka-band satellites
offered one major solution to meeting the demand.
Indeed, there is growing belief that the main market for Ka-band
satellites will be the provision of high speed Internet and Intranet
access.
Thus by 1997 some 59 Ka-band projects had emerged world wide alongside
an intensified R&D effort to refine Ka-band satellite and associated
technologies.
The Ka-band Report provides coverage of both these Ka-band satellite
plans and the associated R&D initiatives.
Ka-band satellites represent a technology breakthrough. As is the
case with so many such breakthroughs in the past, this will change
the way things are done and in ways that are difficult to predict
and even more difficult to forecast. In the earliest days of the
telephone it was believed that its prime use would be to provide
a form of cable TV home entertainment by allowing users to listen
in to concerts.
The satellite industry is a lot more sophisticated in researching
potential markets than the early proponents of the telephone. Nevertheless,
Ka-band satellites appear to be pitched at serving a variety of
niche markets, each with uncertain demand. With the possible exception
of high speed Internet access, no "killer application"
for Ka-band infrastructure is foreseen by the industry.
Some of the major players in the Ka-band environment are now undertaking
the costly and detailed market research on which to centre their
business plans. It is not an easy exercise to do; plans involving
global satellite networks involve researching national markets throughout
the world. Ka-band offers the prospect of new services in new markets,
generally recognised as one of the highest risk market entrance
strategies.
Similarly, the entrance of Ka-band into the communications marketplace
is paralleled by the introduction of complementary technologies
for which the demand is uncertain. The most notable of these are
ATM and digital satellite television. Similarly, other new delivery
infrastructures are being developed that would compete with (and
sometimes complement) Ka-band satellite systems. There too, future
market demand is difficult to forecast. Such competing delivery
infrastructure includes interactive high-speed digital cable networks,
ADSL and VDSL, LMDS and PCNs.
Moreover, it looks highly unlikely that the first Ka-band satellites
will be in operation much before the year 2000. Any realistic forecast
for the demand for Ka-band services will necessarily be long term
and therefore subject to wide margins of error.
Despite these difficulties, The Ka-band Report has analysed each
of the major service markets that Ka-band satellites may address
and come to some robust conclusions.
One conventional piece of wisdom is that Ka-band will be initially
rolled out either to service integrated Ku-band/Ka-band receivers
to provide consumers with a combination of one-way broadcast and
two-way interactive offerings or it will be targeted at big ticket
corporate users.
In the consumer environment, The Ka-band Report concludes that
stand-alone Ka-band terminals, without DBS TV capabilities, are
much more likely to serve a mass market. That in turn suggests that
aiming at corporate users may not be the most desirable initial
market entrance strategy.
Other potential markets that The Ka-band Report considers include
tele-medicine, tele-education, voice, local television, VSATs, "home-use
VSATs" and satellite newsgathering.
However, all of these developments are dependent on the global
marketplace for satellite communications being opened up. The reader
might assume that because satellite television is now ubiquitous
in the developed world and rapidly becoming available in the developing
world that this is already the case.
Unfortunately, this is not the case where two-way satellite communications
is involved. Any cursory knowledge of the satellite PCS environment
will indicate the difficulties of gaining even limited market access
outside of the country of origin of the satellite operator.
The PCS operators have used a variety of levers to gain access.
These include lobbying at the ITU for spectrum, lobbying the US
Government and the FCC to negotiate on their behalf in such fora
as the ITU and WTO, offering franchises to local telecoms companies
to retail their services and sub-contacts to local satellite and
hand-held set manufacturers.
Such an approach is now being taken in the Ka-band environment.
Teledesic appears to have approached just about all the world's
telephone companies and satellite manufacturing and R&D establishments
offering partnership deals. It has also lobbied national governments
and the European Commission, "hijacked" the WRC'95 Ka-band
negotiations and tied up a lot of now relatively scarce Ka-band
spectrum. Teledesic is not the only Ka-band player to have taken
this route.
The Ka-band Report details and analyses the key developments and
issues in this geopolitical environment, including the lead role
being taken by the US Federal Communications Commission, its DISCO
II arrangements and the freedom (or otherwise) of non-US Ka-band
operators to enter the lucrative US market, the concerns of the
European Commission and European industry and World Trade Organisation
negotiations.
Finally, in presenting an over-all picture of the market for Ka-band
satellites, The Ka-band Report takes a special look at one market
that is significantly different - Japan.
The research for The Ka-band Report was undertaken between February
1996 and January 1997. A revision, in the form of the second edition,
was undertaken in June 1997.
It was clear that over this period the number of potential players
in the marketplace was relatively fluid. Some satellite operators
looked at providing Ka-band and found that it was outside of their
main core businesses; others put together ideas that remain on the
back-burner and some plans looked to have been dropped because of
mergers and acquisitions. However, in general, the identified number
of players and plans increased considerably and there was also a
significant refining and development of thinking.
The next big development in satellite communications will be broadband
interactive services involving a combination of Ka-band (or higher)
spectrum, "switchboards in the sky" and inter-satellite
links. The market for services using such technological features
is unproven but currently looks to be a series of niches with no
clear killer application. In the long term there is likely to be
some form of integration of such services with narrowband satellite
delivered PCS services. These are the main conclusions of a new
survey of Ka-band satellite communications called "The Ka-band
Report".
The Big Picture Business Environment: The development of such services
is intimately bound up with the opening up of the international
marketplace for information technology and the convergence of computing,
broadcasting and telecommunications technology. The Ka-band satellite
concept offers the prospect of quick and scaleable (therefore economically
realistic) roll out of advanced infrastructure and services within
this environment and is therefore an issue now high on the political
and world trade agenda.
The Ka-band environment also involves a fundamental shift in the
structure of the satellite communications market from one dominated
by a combination of governmental sponsored international satellite
organisations and regional and domestic satellite systems to global
commercial satellite operations financed through the marshalling
of vast investments from the international financial markets.
The USA Dominates: The current arrangements are dying because Intelsat
and other ISOs are no longer perceived in the United States as suitable
vehicles for maximising US interests in the satellite communications
marketplace. Indeed, there is no doubt that the United States has
taken the lead in both Ka-band technology and the drive to open
up the international marketplace for satellite communications and
therefore the interests of its own domestic manufacturing and communications
industries.
By September 1995, US business was forced to declare its hand in
planning to develop Ka-band satellite infrastructure. The FCC has
set a deadline for filing for authorisation for such systems. What
was revealed was a series of projects that involved global satellite
systems with a high degree of vertical integration between satellite
manufacturers and operators as well as a similar number of filings
to protect the position of operators or of an opportunistic nature.
Since then the rest of the world has followed on with a series
of plans for Ka-band systems, some of which are little more than
paper plans to secure potentially scarce spectrum. Nevertheless
most of the worlds satellite operators now have plans for
Ka-band systems and at least three European satellite manufacturers
have plans that involve a degree of vertical integration with satellite
operating.
Nevertheless, few of the plans originating from outside of the
United States involve true global networks; the mind-set still involves
domestic or regional satellite operations. Only two non-US plans
look to be truly global in capability (those from Alcatel Espace
and SES).
This is a sign of weakness in competing with US interests. The
United States has the upper hand in other ways. It is dominating
the negotiation procedures on spectrum and opening up markets through
the carrot and stick of allowing access to US domestic communications
markets of all sorts. It is ahead of the rest of the world in developing
the key technologies that will be used in the Ka-band environment
- on-board processing and switching, inter-satellite links, phased
array antennas and a vast array of other applicable technology.
The US Government and its industry are also twisting the arms of
its potential rivals in the rest of the world. A key approach to
developing its global satellite networks has been to "offer"
partnerships to local telecommunications carriers and manufacturing
firms. This both spreads commercial risk and assures that such partners
have a vested interested in opening up the markets for the global
satellite systems. It looks possible that other tools may be used
to strengthen the market position of such global operations, such
as allowing access to inter-satellite links.
Lessons for the Satcoms World: Clearly potential operators of Ka-band
satellites are going to have to enter into partnerships with industry
and communications carriers to develop their services and markets.
Whilst it is theoretically possible that the WTO agreements will
give the operators a free hand to enter any market they want, this
is a politically and commercially naïve option.
The Ka-band technology offers the possibility of a direct attack
on the biggest communications market of all, telecommunications
(10 times the size of the broadcasting marketplace).
Satellite operators have hitherto concentrated on marketing transponders
and bandwidth (usually through full time leases) to a limited number
of broadcasting or specialised telecommunications customers, usually
in limited geographic territories. They will need to adapt to a
very different environment of selling variable bandwidth on demand
and exploiting the value added of on-board processing and switching.
Their customer base will radically alter to a much broader base
of commercial networks, intra-company communications, consumer markets
(the US DBS operators are in a strong position here but not their
equivalents elsewhere), interconnection arrangements with PSTNs,
PCS networks, MSS infrastructure, inter-satellite links with other
satellite operators and so on.
It is highly questionable whether the typical satellite operator
of today, employing perhaps around 120-300 staff, is anywhere near
experienced enough to undertake this alone and in a hostile and
competitive international marketplace.
The Ka-band satellite operators will need to address the options
of whether they want to remain wholesalers of capacity or full service
providers (or a combination of both).
In either case they will need to partner with local telecommunications
firms to gain market position, probably interconnection with PSTNs,
facilitate obtaining licences and freedom to transmit data across
borders, contact mechanisms to lobby politicians and so forth. Such
local arrangements allow for mass marketing of Ka-band services
that the satellite operators are ill-equipped to deal with.
Such partnerships also "buy out" potential competition.
The concept can be extended to satellite manufacturing in a world
where such manufacturers are also integrated satellite operators.
Who Wants the Technology? Serious players in the Ka-band market
are now undertaking detailed market research into the likely demand
for services. However, it is clear from conversations with industry
players that there is no single killer application apart from high
speed Internet access. Instead there is likely to be a series of
niche markets ranging from ATM based multimedia for businesses and
personal use, videoconferencing and video telephony, data broadcasting,
voice for remote rural areas, tele-medicine, tele-education, SCADA,
local television, a variety of applications in the mobile environment,
satellite data relay services, news on demand, inter-connection
of satellite and terrestrial PCS networks and satellite news gathering.
What this means in practice this means is that the Ka-band environment
can offer sophisticated next generation VSAT type services including
what the Japanese have called Home-use VSATs.
The one area that has been over-hyped in the Ka-band environment
is the possibility of combining service with digital Ku-band DBS
TV. In this scenario, a consumer could have a single dish that would
provide both conventional TV and a plethora of two-way services,
including, incidentally, voice based on distance insensitive tariffs.
The Ka-band Report concludes that this is unlikely to be a significant
market because digital DBS is a niche market that only marginally
overlaps with the likely market at consumer level for two way services.
Bandwidth limitations for Ka-band preclude its use for mass-market
video on demand. Provision of local TV through Ka-band to the DBS
environment is likely to be viable only in the specific circumstances
of the US marketplace and will only be viable if the DBS operators
go into head on war with the cable operators.
Internet Access: Current thinking amongst many Ka-band proponents
suggests that high speed Internet and Intranet services will be
the major market driver. Ka-band satellites might be able to capture
around 10-15% of the global market for these transmission paths.
Commercial and public sector R&D organisations as well as carriers
are now increasingly focusing technical and market research on this
sector.
Constraints on Ka-band: There are some severe constraints in matching
the supply side with demand.
In most cases transmission costs via satellite are likely to be
significantly higher than those available where there is a reasonably
sophisticated terrestrial infrastructure. That means in most of
the developed world, where such infrastructure is not available,
low levels of purchasing power will dampen demand. Perhaps the one
clear exception to this is in the provision of high speed Internet
access where the main alternative currently remains as ISDN and
where the satellite option looks to be cheaper than using high-speed
cable modems.
The use of geostationary satellites creates significant technical
and commercial disadvantages where voice and two-way video are involved.
This may rule out delivery of some services based on the ATM platform.
However, there is now a growing interest in using low earth orbit
and middle earth orbit to overcome the latency problem.
Use of LEO and MEO satellite configurations involve substantial
initial capital investments by the satellite operators in contrast
to the GSO option. Typically LEO solutions require a near complete
global network of satellites before full commercial service can
start. GSO requires only a single Ka-band payload on a single satellite
before service can start and investment can be scaled up as and
when demand increases. Typically the GSO environment may require
initial investment (and therefore market exposure) of under $200
million whereas the LEO or MEO environment involves initial exposure
well in excess of $1 billion.
The on-board processing and switching payloads are heavy, placing
a severe constraint on what else the satellite can carry. In the
engineering trade-offs needed to accommodate the OBP payload this
may include reduction of station keeping fuel or increasing the
mass of the satellite with associated increases in platform and
launch costs. The R&D establishment continues to work on developing
lower mass OBP equipment but development times are measured in years
rather than months so the benefits from such work will stretch well
into the next decade.
Costs of two way ground stations are far from clear, Whilst Ka-band
proponents have suggested unit prices of $1,000 or less, there remains
considerable scepticism whether such figures can be reached within
the next few years. One potential Ka-band operator has suggested
that the costs of ground stations will need to be subsidised. The
use of LEO and MEO satellite configurations will call for the use
of phased array antennas, which are significantly more expensive
options than the conventional parabolic dish.
There is a growing belief that within the Ka-band there may be
insufficient spectrum to meet the demand for services. Whilst it
was initially expected that some 2.5-3.5 GHz would be available
for GSO satellites, this is being whittled down by demands from
spectrum for LMDS, MSS feeder links and non-geostationary Ka-band
FSS satellites. The alternative is to go to even higher frequencies
but their use in the commercial satellite environment is unproven
and considerable expenditure on R&D may be required. This would
delay start of services.
The Ka-band satellites are complex and require large platforms.
Thus construction time is significantly higher than for conventional
C-band and Ku-band satellites. It appears that the minimum time
is about three years compared to 18 months now generally on offer
by the satellite world. There is also some industry concern about
the reliability of on-board processing systems that needs to be
addressed by the satellite manufacturers.
There are no agreed standards shared between the potential operators
of Ka-band satellites. In general the approach has been to let the
market decide the de facto standards. Whilst there are strong arguments
in favour of this approach (because it allows innovation and, potentially,
a return on investment in developing equipment and intellectual
property), the potential downside is loss of economies of scale
and scope in manufacturing the ground segment.
Capacity Constraints Rule Out VOD: There are some significant limitations
on the capabilities of Ka-band systems. In the VOD environment using
current MPEG-2 based compression techniques a typical HS-601 satellite
could provide around a maximum of 2,300 video circuits. This might
be increased by a factor of 10 through a combination of more advanced
compression techniques such as Wavelet technology and larger satellites.
However, it is not a realistic option for mass market VOD.
Likely Rollout Timetable for Ka-band Satellites: Initial rollout
of service is likely to be in a non-switched environment, using
a limited number of transponders for bent pipe or data broadcasting
type services. SES is planning to roll out services in 1998 at a
time when Eutelsat could also offer ISIS type services using a combination
of Ku-band switching and the Italsat Ka-band platform.
Most of the potential key players in the marketplace are secretive
about their Ka-band plans but both Asiasat and Koreasat look to
be front runners, with new Ka-band capacity available from 1999.
None of the US proposals has yet involved an announcement to cut
metal but one key player has suggested that it may initially roll
out service for the Asian marketplace.
Most of the big players are looking to find partners to invest
and develop service; so far there is little public confirmation
that potential partners are committing serious investment. The typical
reaction from PTOs is "we are considering all options".
They are able to choose between partnering with the new fully private
sector ventures such as SES, Cyberstar or Galaxy (to name a few)
or to operations in which they already have an investment (domestic
or regional satellite operators or the ISOs). The outcome is likely
to involve a major strategic decision both for the PTO and the satellite
operating industry.
It is therefore unrealistic to assume that major Ka-band platforms
will be in operation until well into the year 2000.
Given the need to marshal major investment resources and commercial
partners and the current still restrictive trade environment even
this is optimistic.
Timetables have already been slipping - at one stage it was expected
that construction of the first satellites carrying the Spaceway
payload would begin in late 1995. Even though Hughes now has an
international licence from the FCC and there is hearsay evidence
to suggest it has lined up partners, there has been no announcement
of go-ahead from the company.
Development of US domestic Ka-band satellites has also been delayed
by the lack of award of licences from the FCC - it has faced difficulties
in getting together a workable framework for the different claims
on Ka-band spectrum and auctioning policies (the latter looks to
have been dropped for Ka-band satellites).
Nevertheless, potential users of Ka-band satellites are now looking
seriously at the opportunities open to them. Some of the satellite
service providers have expressed the view that Ka-band is too far
downstream for them to begin serious planning. Others, however,
are now undertaking market research. The Ka-band environment offers
them (and others) the possibility of offering value-added services
over and above straight transmission. These include complete turnkey
services using leased capacity (such as T1 circuits) to offer content
to end users or complete telecommunications networks.
Developments over the last year in the US telecommunications marketplace
also look good for Ka-band. Whilst the received wisdom until mid-summer
was that the cable companies and the telcos were about to engage
in all out warfare to enter each other's marketplace, there is now
a stand-off as they realise costs do not match potential benefits.
The consequence is that heavy investment in providing new services
is not taking place on the scale envisaged. The cable companies
are no longer rushing to provide two-way digital services and the
telephone companies have cold feet about providing broadcast overlays.
Likely Structure of the Future Ka-band Marketplace: Whilst there
are some 59 planned Ka-band satellite systems, the vast majority
of such plans will fall by the wayside. Ka-band is one element in
an overall restructuring of the worlds satellite communications
marketplace.
In the medium term (years' 2000-2010), the overall satellite communications
marketplace (excluding MSS) will consolidate around major commercial
international players (perhaps three to four systems) with a limited
number of regional systems (notably in Asia). The domestic players
will, for the most part, either die or be taken over or, where they
are particularly strong, expand into regional operations.
The future of the ISOs in this environment is uncertain as there
is now considerable pressure to ensure that their dominant economic
power is curtailed.
In the long term (after the year 2010) a feasible scenario may
involve a second-generation global network of switched satellites
providing a combination of narrowband and broadband services through
both geostationary and MEO or LEO satellites. Such networks could
be meshed together with inter-satellite links.
It also looks likely that there will be no winner in the battle
between LEO/MEO systems and GSO systems. Ka-band GSO infrastructure
is already going into place, which means that a market will be locked
into using it through fixed earth stations.
Nevertheless, the technical shortcomings of geostationary satellites
leaves a major market for non-geostationary systems that may include
provision of conventional digital broadcast services. Line of sight
is an endemic and permanent problem for all forms of GSO spacecraft
(MSS, DBS and FSS). MEO and LEO configurations can address the market
gap unserved by GSO (indeed, highly inclined elliptical orbits remain
a further option not so far seriously envisaged by the commercial
Ka-band fraternity).
Europe Needs to Get its Act Together: From the supply side, the
key three markets in the world involved in Ka-band are the USA,
Europe and Japan. The European satellite communications marketplace
is over dependent on conventional DTH/DBS TV. This is now a mature
marketplace and the digital successor looks to be of very limited
potential. Yet its satellite operators are committed to rapidly
expanding capacity to serve the DST marketplace. SES has three satellites
and a spare on order for this marketplace and Eutelsat has a further
three Hot Bird satellites under construction. There are also two
additional Scandinavian satellites going into orbit this year and
which are primarily dedicated to TV traffic.
The only one of the European satellite operators that has positioned
itself for the Ka-band era is SES which has a modest commitment
in the form of two transponders. Eutelsats thinking on Ka-band
is opaque to say the least and it is far from clear whether its
PTO owners would fund investment in a regional Eutelsat Ka-band
infrastructure.
Moreover, Europes plans for Ka-band satellite systems are
focused on serving the low growth European marketplace rather than
the global environment. The Asian environment is largely ignored
but even the most cursory analysis shows that this offers both the
largest and fasted growing market for satellite communications.
Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests that major US proponents of
Ka-band see China as perhaps the largest Ka-band market of them
all.
Europe largely stopped R&D on the Ka-band after the in-orbit
failure of the Olympus satellite. There has subsequently been almost
an emergency response to developments in the USA through funding
of such projects as Secoms. Nevertheless, despite an active OBP
programme in ESA, there are no firm plans from the organisation
to launch an OBP payload and France has opted out from the ESA framework
in favour of Stentor. At the moment it is envisaged that this will
not carry a Ka-band payload and France is also having problems in
funding the project.
Whilst Italy has considerable experience of the Ka-band through
its Italsat project, Alenia Spazio is heavily dependent on EC funding
for development of the Euroskyway project. Indeed it is believed
that Alenia Spazio has asked for much more substantial EC funding.
What is under question is whether Europe has the technological
base to compete effectively in the manufacturing of Ka-band satellites
and whether its satellite operators will, in the long term, be key
players in provision of Ka-band infrastructure.
Europe is also way behind the USA in the development of phased
array antennas.
However, the European Commissions coordinating "Action
Plan" on satellite communications may produce some results.
The European Space Agency is expected in the second half of 1997
to take further initiatives in giving European and Canadian firms
contracts to develop multimedia satellite technologies.
The Peculiar Circumstances of the Japanese Marketplace: The Japanese
market for Ka-band communications remains different from that of
the rest of the world. It looks as if Japan is trying to jump one-step
ahead of Ka-band to provide GBit/s levels of communications as part
of a broader, and still relatively dirigist, approach to communications.
Japan has a long in place Ka-band infrastructure used to provide
trunk telecoms capacity for the PSTN. It also has a substantial
and evolving satellite R&D policy now refocusing away from satellite
platform and payload development to a dual environment including
tighter focus on provision of service.
The position of the key Japanese satellite operators in the broadband
multimedia environment is unclear. JSC has not filed for Ka-band
capacity but SCC has filed for a significant increase in its Ka-band
capacity (it already has Ka-band capacity but with onboard processing
and switching).
Is Ka-band a Will othe Wisp? No. The commercial risks of
the Ka-band environment are probably considerably lower than the
LEO/MEO MSS environment but the latter has already seen massive
marshalling of finance and is just about to start service. The Ka-band
environment offers less risk because it addresses the needs of a
wide portfolio of services and demand. It also facilitates development
of a wide variety of new services and applications. The use of GSO
satellites in the Ka-band environment also presents the possibility
of considerably lower capital investment exposure than the MSS environment.
The current constraints on developing Ka-band are mostly technical
or lack of access to markets because of trade constraints. Both
are now being addressed.
This is not to say that some of the thinking behind offering Ka-band
services is flawed. One conclusion of The Ka-band Report is that
the Teledesic approach is extremely high risk - it addresses a narrow
niche centred on PC to PC communications and Internet access and
involves a capital exposure of at $9 billion. Moreover, the technical
aspects of the configuration are questionable. It is highly unlikely
that the satellite system can be integrated with other services
such as MSS and DBS.
One also suspects that it is politically unrealistic given that
hidden barriers to trade and protection of markets will be endemic
over the next decade despite any WTO agreements.
There is some clear indication that Ka-band multimedia satellites
offer major end user cost savings over conventional Ku-band systems.
US consulting firm TelAstra has compared the costs of offering data
communications through Ku-and DBS satellites and through Ka-band.
It found that the former would involve transmission costs eight
times higher than in Ka-band.
Risk Analysis: Basic analysis of the market positioning of satellite
based switched services suggests that many new services will be
high risk ventures to launch. Low risk launches usually involve
existing products into existing markets; highest risk launches involve
new products in new markets. The relationship between whether the
product is new or existing and whether the market is new or existing
can be plotted on a simple 2*2 matrix, with the highest risk opportunities
lying in the bottom right hand quadrant. (Table not shown here)
The implication of inter-satellite links: The plans from US GSO
operators aiming at the global marketplace indicate a potential
shift away from current dominant orbital slots in the international
satellite market place. Inter-satellite links obviate the need for
satellites placed over the main Ocean Regions to provide international
communications. Instead, operational satellites can (and are planned
to) be centred over landmasses where there are customers and where
better line of sight can be provided.
New dominant orbital slots will therefore emerge and content providers
may be forced to use them (rather than existing slots) to gain access
to households. Moreover, the combination of global coverage and
inter-satellite links means that each content provider may only
need one uplink site to provide global distribution through a plethora
of spacecraft.
Nevertheless, it is difficult not to conclude that inter-satellite
links could be used as a tool by some operators to leverage their
market position into an anti-competitive environment. This is particularly
the case if there are no agreed technical standards for inter-satellites
and no regulation of inter-connect rates.
Key Developments Expected in Ka-band in 1997: Whilst the Ka-band
opportunity featured highly in 1995 in the debate on the future
of satellite communications, developments in 1996 were distinctly
low key, if not inconclusive.
Nevertheless, 1997 will see some major milestones in the progress
towards operational broadband multimedia satellites -
The WTO negotiations on opening up the market for satellite communications
were completed on 15 February 1997. These may render the FCCs
DISCO II proposals on opening up the satcoms marketplace either
semi-redundant- or the basis for future bilateral negotiations.
In early May 1997 the Federal Communications Commission finally
granted licences to the geostationary orbit applicants following
a log series of negotiations with the players involved.
On 27th June 1997 the European Commissions Action Plan on
satellite communications was agreed by the Council of Ministers.
Whilst the Commission has very limited economic and legal power
in the satcoms arena, the Action Plan represents its attempt to
coordinate European policy in the face of intense competition from
US interests.
Further orders for Ka-band space segment are expected this year
with Koreasat and Asiasat being front runners in Asia and SES in
Europe.
The number of serious Ka-band plans emanating from the USA will
reduce. Such consolidation is natural at this stage in market development.
There will be growing interest in the LEO and MEO Ka-band option
and, possibly, the use of even higher frequencies.
Two-way Internet access services using Ku-band (and, possibly,
C-band) will be rolled out through 1997 as equipment manufacturers
and service providers instigate new products and services. These
will be precursor services to Ka-band Internet delivery.
The ATM Forum will set standards for ATM standards for use with
satellites.
In October and November WRC 97 will cover spectrum and Ka-band
for feeder links and use of high frequencies as an alternative to
Ka-band.
The major proponents of Ka-band will continue to seek partners
amongst PTOs, other carriers and industry to finance and market
their projects.
|